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Corporate governance: beyond convergence? A comparative analysis in the wake of the global credit crunch

Published Online:pp 234-250https://doi.org/10.1504/GBER.2009.031171

The relative merits of shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance have long been contested. Liberalisation and globalisation of financial markets resulted in the suggestion of potential convergence along shareholder principles. Research has attempted to justify the supremacy of one system over the other, however empirical evidence is weak. The culturally embedded nature of corporate governance within institutional frameworks suggests that transposition of single features may be inappropriate and may disrupt the overall efficiencies of a national system. The proportionality debate remains a key limiting factor in attempts at alignment. This paper will review the current state of the debate. It will employ comparative analysis to identify the path dependent evolution of corporate governance, contrasting differences within and between specific shareholder and stakeholder models. It will demonstrate alternative national responses to globalising pressures, to consider whether or not the contemporary situation can indeed, be regarded as one: beyond convergence?

Keywords

corporate governance, comparative analysis, global credit crunch, path dependence, institutional analysis, convergence, shareholder models, stakeholder models, globalisation